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I. INTRODUCTION  
Computers play an integral role in today’s society.  They do everything from maintaining 
payroll accounts and issuing checks to providing unlimited access to information worldwide.  
While computers provide many benefits, they are increasingly used as tools for wrongdoing, 
causing estimated losses of billions of dollars each year.
1
  Computer hackers can, among other 
things, fraudulently alter accounts, steal business or personal information, and corrupt or disable 
computer systems.  Congress enacted and has repeatedly amended the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (“CFAA”) to combat the increasing proliferation of computer crimes.2 
The primary substantive provisions of the CFAA are predicated on the defendant 
accessing a protected computer without authorization or by exceeding authorized access.
3
  A 
majority of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, to address the meanings of  “without authorization” or 
“exceeded authorized access,”  has adopted definitions that alarmingly broaden  the scope of the 
Act.
4
  For example, if a child accesses a text message from a parent’s phone without permission, 
she is subject to criminal prosecution.  Similarly, under the Circuit Courts of Appeals’ majority 
approach to determining the scope of the phrase “exceeds authorized access,” a person misstating 
                                                        
* Professor of Law at the University of Detroit-Mercy; J.D., 1979, Stanford University. 
1
 See Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?”—A Primer on the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act for Civil Litigators, 63 S. C. L. REV. 141, 150 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting 
Access and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1605 (2003); Charlotte Decker, 
Note, Cyber Crime 2.0: An Argument to Update the United States Criminal Code to Reflect the Changing Nature of 
Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 961 (2008); see also Tuma, supra, at 146, 151 (citing studies indicating that 
65% of people worldwide have been the victim of some type of cyber crime and 80-90% of businesses have 
experienced information security breaches). 
2
 See 18 U.S.C. §1030 (2006 & Supp. II 2008); see also infra notes 7-18 and accompanying text. 
3
 See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
4
 See infra notes 19-50 and accompanying text. 
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their age on a dating website could be subject to imprisonment. These results are untenable.  Two 
recent Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions have adopted narrower definitions of the phrases 
“without authorization” and “exceeded authorized access.”5  While these definitions represent an 
improvement over the broader tests, the narrower definitions are incomplete and may exclude 
paradigm cases of computer fraud.
6
  Accordingly, this article argues that the Courts of Appeals 
have not adequately interpreted the foundational terms of the Act and recommends an 
interpretation of the Act that builds upon the narrower definitions to comprehensively define the 
scope of the Act’s coverage. 
Part II of this article will provide a brief description of the CFAA.  Part III will describe 
the three primary approaches that the courts have adopted to define “without authorization” and 
“exceeds authorized access.”  Part IV will discuss the shortcomings of each of the three primary 
approaches.  Part V will provide a preferred interpretation of the Act, suggest possible 
amendments to the Act to ensure that courts follow the recommended interpretation, discuss the 
benefits of following this article’s recommendations, and illustrate the application of the 
suggested approach. 
 
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CFAA 
The CFAA was enacted in 1984 as a limited criminal statute to punish persons both 
misusing computers to obtain national security secrets or personal financial records and hacking 
into government computers.
7
  Through a series of amendments, the scope of the Act has greatly 
                                                        
5
 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012); WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 
199 (4th Cir. 2012). 
6
 See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text. 
7
 See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 
(1994); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1564 
(2010). 
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expanded.
8
  Whereas the Act originally applied to misuse of computers used by financial 
institutions or the United States government, the current version covers all computers used in or 
affecting commerce, including computers located outside the United States that affect commerce 
or communication in the United States.
9
  Given access to the Internet, this covers virtually all 
business, home and laptop computers.
10
  
The 1994 Amendments to the Act provided for civil liability as well.
11
  Under subsection 
(g) of the current Act, “Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this 
section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and 
injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”12  However, a private plaintiff is limited to economic 
damages and generally, must show a loss
13
 aggregating at least $5,000 in value.
14
 
New substantive provisions also have been added to the Act.  The three most significant 
provisions, sections 1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(4) and (a)(5), cover  obtaining  computer information 
without authorized access,  certain computer frauds, and  some actions resulting in damage or 
                                                        
8
 See Kerr, supra note 1, at 1563-71 (providing a detailed description of each of the amendments to the CFAA). 
9
 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
10
 See United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 457 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009), citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997); see also Kerr, supra note 1, at 1663.  The Act’s 
definition of “computer” extends beyond coverage of traditional computers. “Computer” is defined to include any 
device that is “an electronic … or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage 
functions….” Under this definition cell phones, iPods, computerized airbags and a myriad of other electronic 
devices are computers. See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902-3 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Mitra, 
405 F.3d 492, 495-96 (7th Cir. 2005); Kerr, supra note 7, at 1577. 
11
 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796; Dice Corp. v. 
Bold Technologies, No. 11-13578, 2012 WL 263031, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2012). 
12
 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
13
 “Loss” is defined as “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting 
a damage assessment, and restoring the data program, system or information to its condition prior to the offense, and 
any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.” 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Courts have held that “loss” “encompasses only two types of harm: 
costs to investigate and respond to an offense, and costs incurred because of a service interruption.” Alliantgroup, 
L.P. v. Feingold, 803 F. Supp. 2d 610, 630 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
14
  See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  A loss of $5,000 is required unless the plaintiff can show an 
effect on the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of an individual, physical injury to any person, a 
threat to public health or safety or damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the United States 
Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1030(c)(4)(A)(I)-(V) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Very few plaintiffs allege any of these alternatives to a loss of 
$5,000.  See Tuma, supra note 1, at 183. 
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loss to a protected computer, respectively.
15
  More specifically, subsection (a)(2)(C) imposes 
liability on a person who, ”intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds 
authorized access, and thereby obtains …information from any protected computer.”16  
Section (a)(4) prohibits use by any person who, 
knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct 
furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the 
fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the 
value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period.
17
                                                         
  
Finally, section (a)(5) provides for punishment of any person who, 
(A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or 
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without 
authorization, to a protected computer;  
(B) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a 
result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or  
(C) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of 
such conduct, causes damage and loss.
18
       
     
Violations under  sections (a)(2) and (a)(4) require that the person accessing the protected 
computer is “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access. Section (a)(5) imposes 
liability for unintentional damage or loss only where the access is “without authorization.” 
Accordingly, the interpretation of the terms “without authorization” and “in excess of 
authorization” is critical in understanding the scope of the CFAA.  
                                                        
15
  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Amendments to the Act also prohibit trafficking, with an intent to 
defraud, “in any password or other information through which a computer may be accessed without 
authorization…”, and extorting money or other thing of value through threats to cause damage to a protected 
computer or threats to obtain or impair the confidentiality of information.  18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(6)-(7). 
16
 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
17
 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
18
 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Fraud under this section simply requires wrongdoing, not the 
elements of common law fraud.  See, e.g., T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Terry, No. 3:11-cv-5655-RBL, 2012 WL 1409287, 
at *6 n.1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 23, 2012); eBay Inc. v. Digital Point Solutions, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1164 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009); Shurguard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (W.D. Wash. 
2000).  Allegations of fraud under this section also do not need to meet the specificity requirements for fraud under 
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Facebook, Inc. v. MaxBounty, Inc. 274 F.R.D. 279, 284 
(N.D. Cal. 2011); SKF USA, Inc. v. Bjerkness, 636 F. Supp. 2d 696, 719 n.13 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
13 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1 (2012)  5 
III. THE EXISTING APPROACHES FOR DEFINING “WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION” AND 
“EXCEEDING AUTHORIZED ACCESS” 
 
Courts have not agreed on the proper interpretation of “without authorization” and 
“exceeds authorized access.”  Rather, they have adopted three different approaches to 
interpreting these terms.  Each of these approaches is described below.  
 
A. Agency Approach 
The agency approach arose in the employer-employee relationship context and took a 
broad view of who is unauthorized to access a computer, thereby expanding the potential scope 
of the CFAA.  This approach originated in Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self 
Storage, Inc.,
19
 and gained credibility following Judge Posner’s adoption of the approach in 
International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin.
20
  
In Shurgard, the plaintiff alleged that former employees appropriated trade secrets stored 
on the plaintiff’s computer in violation of sections 1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(4), and (a)(5)(C).21  The 
defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim arguing that the foundation for a violation 
of those sections, access without authorization or exceeding authorized access, was not alleged 
and could not be proven.
22
  The Court denied the defendant’s motion, reasoning that under the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, the employees’ authorization ended when they obtained 
information on behalf of their employer’s competitor.23  Quoting the Restatement, the Court 
stated,  
                                                        
19
 Shurgard Storage Ctrs., 119 F.  Supp. 2d 1121. 
20
 Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
21
 Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23.  The plaintiff also alleged a variety of state claims.  Id. 
at 1122. 
22
 Id. at 1124. 
23
 Id. at 1125. 
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Unless otherwise agreed, the authority of an agent terminates if, without 
knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise 
guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.
24
  
 
In Citrin, the defendant deleted all of the data from his company laptop after he decided 
to leave the plaintiff’s employ and go into business for himself.  Judge Posner, citing Shurgard 
and the Restatement, held that the authorization to access the computer terminated when the 
defendant “resolved to destroy files that . . . were also the property of the employer, in violation 
of the duty of loyalty that agency imposes on an employee.”25 
Especially with Justice Posner’s imprimatur, many courts have felt compelled to discuss 
the agency theory for defining “without authorization.”26  However, no other Circuit Court of 
Appeals has adopted the agency approach.  Nonetheless, the agency approach remains the law in 
the Seventh Circuit
27
 and has been followed by a few district courts outside the Seventh 
Circuit.
28
 
 
B. Contract Approach 
 The contract approach to defining “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized 
access” focuses on how the parties agreed to define their rights and duties.  Under this approach, 
                                                        
24
 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958)).  The Court also found support for its decision in 
ambiguous language from the legislative history of the Act.  Id. at 1128-29. 
25
 Int’l Airport Ctrs., 440 F.3d at 420. 
26
 See, e.g., LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009); Farmers Bank & Trust, N.A. v. 
Witthuhn, No. 11-2011-JAR, 2011 WL 4857926, at *4 (D. Kan. Oct. 13, 2011); Lewis-Burke Assoc., Inc. v. 
Widder, 725 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192 (D.D.C. 2010); Grant Mfg. & Alloying, Inc. v. McIlvain, No. 10-1029, 2011 WL 
4467767, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2011); WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, No. 10-cv-2775-CMC, 
2011 WL 379458, at *3 n.5 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2011); Univ. Sports Pub. Co. v. Playmakers Media Co., 725 F. Supp. 2d 
378, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Bell Aerospace Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Aero Servs., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d. 1267, 1272 (M.D. 
Ala. 2010); US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1192 (D. Kan. 2009); Black & Decker (US), Inc. 
v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (W.D. Tenn. 2008). 
27
 See, e.g., Jarosch v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 837 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1021 (E.D. Wisc. 2011).  
28
 See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hollander, NO. C 08-1039, 2010 WL 2851639, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Jul 20, 
2010); Guest-Tek Interactive Entm’t, Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2009); NCMIC Finance Corp. 
v. Artino 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1057-58 (S.D. Iowa 2009); Ervin & Smith Adver & Pub. Relations, Inc. v. Ervin, 
No. 8:08CV459, 2009 WL 249998, at *8 (D. Neb. Feb. 3, 2009). 
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the terms of use of a website, the provisions in an employment contract or the terms of other 
contractual arrangements, allow the parties to define the scope of permission to access any 
protected computer.  If the person who is granted access under the contract violates any of its 
terms, she is viewed as unauthorized or exceeding authorized access for purposes of the CFAA. 
The theory behind the contract approach is simple: if a person needs authorization to access a 
computer, the owner of the computer should be able to restrict or condition the access.
29
  When 
the person obtains information in violation of the restriction or condition, they have exceeded 
authorization and obtained information they were “not entitled so to obtain.”30 
 The First Circuit in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.,
31
 was the first Court of 
Appeals to adopt the contract approach.  In EF Cultural, the plaintiff sued a competing tour 
company and some of the plaintiff’s former executives.32  The plaintiff alleged that the former 
executives utilized confidential tour codes to enable its competitor to obtain the plaintiff’s 
pricing information with a scraper program.
33
  The Court found that the use of this proprietary 
information violated the plaintiff’s broad confidentiality agreement, which prohibited the 
disclosure of information “‘which reasonably might be construed to be contrary to the interests 
of EF.’”34  Therefore, the Court concluded that if the plaintiff’s allegations were true, the 
defendants had exceeded the contractually authorized access.
35
 
                                                        
29
 See, e.g., Cont’l Group, Inc. v. KW Prop. Mgmt, LLC, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
30
 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(6) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); see also Reply Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, United States 
v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-10038), 2010 WL 6191782. 
31
 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). 
32
 Id. at 579-80. 
33
 Id. at 579 (describing the use of a scraper program which focused solely on EF’s website; a scraper program, like 
a robot, performs searching, copying and retrieving functions on the web, executing thousands of commands per 
minute, far in excess of what an individual can do).  See also eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 
1058, 1060-61 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Christine Galbraith, Access Denied, Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320, 332-33 (2004).  
34
 EF Cultural Travel BV, 274 F.3d at 583. 
35
 Id. 
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 In U.S. v. Rodriguez,
36
 an employee of the Social Security Administration accessed, for 
non-business reasons, personal information of several women he knew.
37
  The Administration 
specifically prohibited accessing information from its databases for non-business related 
purposes.
38
  Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “the plain language of the Act 
forecloses any argument that Rodriguez did not exceed his authorized access.”39 
 In U.S. v. John,
40
 the Fifth Circuit also relied, in part, on contractual limitations on 
authorization, to support a finding that the defendant exceeded authorized access to information 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).  In this case, the defendant provided her half-brother with 
customer account information that enabled him and others to create fraudulent charges.
41
  Even 
though the defendant, as an account manager, was authorized to access customer account 
information,
42
 the Court emphasized that John’s use of that information to perpetuate a fraud was 
contrary to the plaintiff’s official policies and therefore,  her access for those purposes was “in 
excess of authorization.”43 
 EF Cultural, Rodriguez, and John, all arose in the employer-employee context. However, 
several courts have indicated that the contract approach applies outside that milieu.
 44
  In 
particular, the contract approach can also be used to deem access in excess of authorization when 
a website user violates a site’s terms of use.45  For example, in America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 
                                                        
36
 United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011). 
37
 Id. at 1260-61. 
38
 Id. at 1260. 
39
 Id. at 1263. 
40
 United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010). 
41
 Id. at 269.  
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. at 272-73. 
44
 See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2003); FXDirectDealer, LLC v. Abadi, No. 
12 Civ 1796(CM), 2012 WL 1155139, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 461 
(C.D. Cal. 2009); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
45
 Id. 
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Inc.,
46
 the Court found that the defendant’s use of AOL to send bulk e-mails in violation of 
AOL’s terms of use constituted access in excess of authorization.47 
 A majority of the Circuit Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue have adopted 
the contract approach for defining “in excess of authorization.”48  It is also the approach 
advocated by the Justice Department,
49
 and some district court decisions outside those circuits.
50
 
 
  C.  Plain Meaning Approach 
 The “plain meaning” approach interprets “without authorization,” an undefined term 
under the Act, as referring to “outsiders”51 – those without any permission to access the protected 
computer.
 52
  This approach construes “exceeds authorized access” as when “insiders,” those 
permitted to access a protected computer, access information on the protected computer that the 
insider is not so entitled to obtain.
53
 
                                                        
46
 Am. Online, 46 F. Supp. 2d 444. 
47
 Id. at 451. 
48
 See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 
(5th Cir. 2010); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 (1st Cir. 2001). 
49
 Brief for the United States, United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-10038), 2010 WL 
6191778. 
50
 See, e.g., FXDirectDealer, LLC v. Abadi, No. 12 Civ. 1796, 2012 WL 1155139, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012); 
Grant Manuf. & Alloying, Inc. v. McIlvain, Civil Action No. 10-1029, 2011 WL 4467767, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 
2011); Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. KW Prop. Mgm’t, LLC, 622 F.  Supp. 2d 1357, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
51
 See United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007). 
52
 See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
53
 See infra note 59.  A few commentators, see Garrett D. Urban, Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: 
The Limitations of Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 52 WM & MARY L. REV. 1369, 1379-82 (2011); Katherine Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or 
Contract: Determining Employees’ Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
819, 826 (2009), have suggested that courts adopting the plain language approach were really applying the “code-
based” approach advocated by Professor Orin S. Kerr in his seminal article, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting 
Access and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, supra note 1. The difference between the two approaches 
is that the code-based approach presumes that an insider is entitled to obtain all information that is not password (or 
otherwise technologically) protected.  Under the plain language approach, password protected information is just 
one category of information that an insider is not entitled to obtain.  For example, assume a doctor has a password to 
access all patient files at a hospital. If the doctor uses the password to access files of persons who are not his 
patients, there could be a violation of section (a)(2)(C) under the plain language approach.  There would be no 
violation under the code-based approach. Only one district court and one lower court state case has explicitly 
adopted the code-based approach.  See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08–05780 JW, 2012 WL 
542586, at *1038-*1040 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2012); State v. Riley, 988 A.2d 1252, 1258 (N.J. Super. 2009). 
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 The Ninth Circuit first adopted the “plain meaning” approach in LVRC Holdings, LLC v. 
Brekka.
54
  In that case, an employer brought suit against a former employee alleging, among 
other things, that the employee e-mailed a number of documents to his personal email account 
during discussions pertaining to the possibility of purchasing an ownership interest in the 
plaintiff-company.
55
  The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant on the 
plaintiff’s CFAA claim, finding that the defendant’s access was authorized and that he did not 
exceed his authorized access.
56
  In interpreting the phrase “without authorization,” the Court 
began with the “‘fundamental canon of statutory construction … that, unless otherwise defined, 
words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”57  Finding 
the dictionary definition of authorization to be “permission,” the Court concluded that the 
defendant was not “without authorization” because the defendant had permission to access the 
plaintiff’s computer.58  The Court, referring to the statutory definition in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6), 
interpreted “exceeds authorized access” as when “a person has permission to access the 
computer, but accesses information on the computer that the person is not entitled to access.”59  
Given that the defendant was entitled to access the information he e-mailed to his personal 
account, he could not be found to have exceeded authorized access.
60
  The Court specifically 
rejected the plaintiff’s Citrin-based argument that permission terminated when the defendant 
took actions inconsistent with the plaintiff’s interest.  The Court found the agency approach to be 
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and contrary to the rule of lenity.
61
 
                                                        
54
 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
55
 Id. at 1129-30. 
56
 Id. at 1135. 
57
 Id. at 1132, citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). 
58
 Id. at 1133. 
59
 Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133. 
60
 Id. at 1135. 
61
 Id. at 1134-35.  The rule of lenity “requires courts to limit the reach of criminal statutes to the clear import of their 
text and construe any ambiguity against the government.”  Id. at 1135 (quoting United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 
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 The Ninth Circuit, in an en banc decision, recently reaffirmed their decision in Brekka, 
and explicitly rejected the contract approach to defining “exceeding authorized access.”62  In 
Nosal, several employees of an executive search firm downloaded and transferred confidential 
files to the defendant, a former employee of the search firm, who was starting a competing 
business.
63
  The government acknowledged that the employees had authorization to access the 
information, but alleged that their actions violated the plaintiff’s policy of forbidding the 
disclosure of confidential information.
64
  To support its position, the government focused on the 
word “so” in section 1030(e)(6) (“accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter” (emphasis 
added)).  The government argued that “so” meant “in that manner,” which it claimed had to refer 
to restrictions on information use.
65
  A narrower reading, the government argued, would make 
the word “so” superfluous.66  The original Court of Appeals panel adopted the government’s 
argument.
67
  
 Although the en banc panel acknowledged that the government’s contract approach-
based argument, with its reliance on the word “so,” was not an unreasonable reading of the 
statute,
68
 it reversed the three-judge panel’s decision, believing that the government’s reading 
would unduly expand the scope of the Act.
69
  The Court reasoned that “the government’s 
interpretation would transform the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute into an expansive 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2006)).  The rule “vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen should be held 
accountable for violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly 
prescribed.”  Id. at 1134-35(quoting United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008)).  The Brekka court reasoned, 
“If the employer has not rescinded the defendant’s right to use the computer, the defendant would have no reason to 
know that making personal use of the company computer in breach of a state law fiduciary duty to an employer 
would constitute a criminal violation of the CFAA.”  Id. at 1135. 
62
 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
63
 Id. at 856. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. at 857. 
66
 Id. 
67
 See United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
68
 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858. 
69
 Id. 
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misappropriation statute.”70 The Court was unwilling to displace a substantial portion of the 
common law absent clear Congressional intent to do so.
71
  The Court also feared that the 
government’s position would criminalize “minor dalliances” by people unaware that their 
conduct violated any criminal prohibition.
72
  For example, employees routinely use work 
computers for personal reasons, yet many corporate policies prohibit such uses.
73
  The possibility 
of liability for violation of a website’s terms of use was even more troubling to the court.74  The 
Court cited Google’s policy, since changed, forbidding minors from using its services.75  Under 
the government’s approach, a seventeen year-old, who researched a school paper on Google, 
would have violated section (a)(2)(C) of the Act.  Such results were particularly troubling to the 
Court given the low number of people who actually read or understand the companies’ terms of 
use.
76
  Finally, the Court denied that its interpretation would make the word “so” in section 
1030(e)(6) superfluous: 
The word has meaning even if it doesn't refer to use restrictions. Suppose an 
employer keeps certain information in a separate database that can be viewed on a 
computer screen, but not copied or downloaded. If an employee circumvents the 
security measures, copies the information to a thumb drive and walks out of the 
building with it in his pocket, he would then have obtained access to information 
in the computer that he is not “entitled so to obtain.” Or, let's say an employee is 
given full access to the information, provided he logs in with his username and 
password. In an effort to cover his tracks, he uses another employee's login to 
copy information from the database. Once again, this would be an employee who 
is authorized to access the information but does so in a manner he was not 
authorized “so to obtain.” Of course, this all assumes that “so” must have a 
substantive meaning to make sense of the statute. But Congress could just as well 
have included “so” as a connector or for emphasis.77 
      
                                                        
70
 Id. at 857. 
71
 Id., citing Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000). 
72
 Id. at 859. 
73
 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860 
74
 Id. at 860-61. 
75
 Id. at 861. 
76
 Id. at 862. 
77
 Id. at 858. 
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 Most recently, the Fourth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit’s basic approach but 
interpreted the Act even more narrowly than the approach suggested by the court in Nosal.
 78
  In 
WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC, an employee with access to confidential information 
downloaded that information to his personal computer in violation of the company policy, which 
prohibited such downloads.
79
  After he resigned from his position with the plaintiff, the 
defendant used that information to solicit an account for plaintiff’s competitor.80  The Fourth 
Circuit, citing the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Nosal and Brekka, and relying on the rule of lenity 
and the plain language of the Act, held that the defendant’s actions did not violate the Act.81  The 
Fourth Circuit interpreted the word “so” as a connector or a term of emphasis, and specifically 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s suggested alternative meanings of the word.82  The court stated, 
“Congress has not clearly criminalized obtaining or altering information ‘in a manner’ that is not 
authorized.  Rather, it has simply criminalized obtaining or altering information that an 
individual lacked authorization to obtain or alter.”83 
 To date, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits are the only Courts of Appeals to adopt the plain 
meaning approach.
84
  However, a majority of the recent district court decisions that are not 
bound by opposing precedent have followed the Ninth Circuit approach.
85
  Some of those courts, 
                                                        
78
 See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012). 
79
 Id. at 202. 
80
 Id. 
81
 Id. at 207. 
82
 Id. 
83
 Id. at 206. 
84
 See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, 687 F.3d at 206; Nosal, 676 F.3d 854; Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127. 
85
 See Farmers Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Witthuhn, No. 11-2011- JAR, 2011 WL 4857926, at *4 (D. Kan. Oct. 13, 
2011) (“the Brekka line of cases … has recently gained critical mass”); Lewis-Burke Assoc., LLC v. Widder, 725 F.  
Supp. 2d 187, 192-93 (D.D.C. 2010) (same); see also Ajuba Int’l, LLC v. Saharia, No. 11–12936, 2012 WL 
1672713, at *10-11 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2012); Grant Mfg. & Alloying, Inc. v. McIlvain, No. 10–1029, 2011 WL 
4467767, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2011); United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
Univ. Sports Pub. Co. v. Playmakers Media Co., 725 F. Supp. 2d 378, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Bell Aerospace 
Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Aero Servs., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d. 1267, 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2010); ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts 
Medical, LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 612-13 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 
1189, 1192-93 (D. Kan. 2009); Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935-36 (W.D. Tenn. 
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however, have indicated that they would use a hybrid approach to define “in excess of 
authorization,”86 suggesting that the “plain language” is not so plain.  That is, they would 
consider contractual limitations when deciding whether a defendant was entitled to obtain or 
alter information on the protected computer.
87
  
 The plain language approach is an incomplete solution for defining “without 
authorization” and “exceeding authorized access” under the Act and may exclude paradigm cases 
of computer fraud.  However, it is a better approach than the agency and contract approaches, 
both of which, improperly and unnecessarily expand the scope of the Act to cover employee 
breach of loyalty or theft of trade secret cases. 
 
IV. THE SHORTCOMING OF THE EXISTING APPROACHES FOR DEFINING “WITHOUT 
AUTHORIZATION” AND “EXCEEDING AUTHORIZED ACCESS” 
 
A. Agency Approach 
 The agency approach is the most inconsistent approach with the language and the 
legislative history of the Act. It also has the greatest potential to produce absurd results.  The 
apparent motivation for adopting the agency approach is to punish theft of trade secrets.  
However, it is neither necessary nor desirable to contort the Act to achieve that result. 
 As the Court indicated in Brekka, no language in the CFAA supports the “argument that 
authorization to use a computer ceases when an employee resolves to use the computer contrary 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
2008).  Many of these courts, much like the Court in Brekka, explain that 1) the plain language of the Act prohibits 
improper access, not misuse or misappropriation, 2) the rule of lenity requires interpreting the Act narrowly and 3) 
the legislative history of the Act indicates the purpose was to prevent hacking, not misappropriation.  See, e.g., 
Ajuba, 2012 WL 1672713, at *11; Grant Mfg. & Alloying, 2011 WL 4467767, at *7. University Sports Pub. Co., 
725 F. Supp. 2d at 383-84; US Bioservices Corp., 595 F. Supp. 2d  at 1193-94; Brett Senior & Assocs., P.C. v. 
Fitzgerald, No. 06-1412, 2007 WL 2043377, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
86
 See Farmers Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Witthuhn, 11-20110 JAR, 2011 WL 4857926, at *4-*5; Grant Mfg. & 
Alloying, Inc. v. McIlvain, No. 10-1029, 2011 WL 4467767, at *7. 
87
 See also, Pamela Taylor, Comment, To Steal or Not to Steal: An Analysis of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
and Its Effect on Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201, 230-31 (2012) (recommending adoption of the Brekka 
“narrow view” and suggesting employers can protect themselves through company policies on access). 
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to the employer’s interest.”88  Rather the “plain language” (to the extent language is ever “plain”) 
is to the contrary.  The CFAA prohibits “unauthorized access” to information; it does not 
prohibit the misuse or misappropriation of information.
89
  The statutory definitions of damage 
and loss also suggest that the Act is concerned with computer hacking, alteration of data or 
information, and disruption of computer services; it is not concerned with the misuse of 
information, injury to one’s competitive position, or loss of revenue.  Damage is defined as “any 
impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system or information.”90  Loss is 
“any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a 
damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system or information to its condition prior 
to the offense, and any consequential damages incurred because of interruption of services.”91  
Finally, the agency approach conflates “unauthorized access” with “exceeds authorized access” 
in employee-employer cases, the only context in which the agency theory is applicable.  That is, 
an employee who exceeds authorized access has breached her duty of loyalty and therefore, she 
would be unauthorized under the agency theory. 
 One court has suggested that the agency approach “does not focus on an employee's later 
misuse of information but instead, it focuses on an employee's initial access to the employer's 
computer with the intent to either obtain information or defraud the employer.”92  This view is 
problematic on several levels.  First, stating that the focus is on access and not misuse seems 
disingenuous when the intent at the time of access can only be proven by subsequent misuse.  
Second, an employee’s initial access will rarely be a breach of their duty of loyalty.  Rather, 
                                                        
88
 LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). 
89
 See Orbit One Commc’n, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F.  Supp. 2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Shamrock Foods 
Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Ariz. 2008); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Werner-
Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499-09 (D. Md. 2005). 
90
 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
91
 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
92
NCMIC Finance Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1059 (S.D. Iowa 2009). 
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employees will typically breach their duty of loyalty during a workday in which initial access to 
the computer was for proper work purposes.  Third, the court’s approach would treat similar 
situations disparately without any justification.  For example, suppose an employee emails 
confidential information to her personal computer so that she can use it for work-related 
purposes at home.  If that employee later sent confidential information to her employer’s 
competitor from home, there would be no violation of the Act because she is authorized to use 
her own computer and the information was “obtained” from the “protected computer” with 
authorization.  To suggest that such an employee should be treated differently than the employee 
who sends the same information from their work computer is anomalous.  Fourth, a focus on 
intent at the time of access is troublingly subjective.  It also makes much of the language in 
section (a)(4) of the Act superfluous in employee-employer cases.  That section requires “intent 
to defraud.”93  Yet if there was intent to defraud, which is obviously contrary to the employer’s 
interests, there would automatically be no authorization, making the “without authorization” or 
“exceeds authorized access” requirement superfluous.94  
 Although the statutory language is the best indicator of Congressional intent, the 
legislative history of the Act also suggests that Congress did not wish to define “without 
authorization” by the agency approach.  According to the legislative history, the Act was 
principally designed to cover “hackers” and punish offenses consummated on a computer.95  
                                                        
93
 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
94
 A standard canon of statutory interpretation is, “a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can 
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous.”  See Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 467 
(1998). 
95
 See 132 CONG. REC. H3275-04, 1986 WL 779755 (statement of Rep. Hughes) (“[C]omputer technology-with all 
its gains-has left us with a new breed of criminal: The technologically sophisticated criminal who breaks into 
computerized data files. One element of this expanding group of electronic trespassers-the so-called hacker….”); Id. 
(statement of Rep. Nelson) (“[W]e are confronting a new type of criminal today.  It is not the kind of criminal who 
uses the crowbar, but a criminal who uses the computer keyboard …”); S. Rep. 99-432, at 9, 99th Cong.  2d Sess. 
1986, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2487 (1986) (Section 1030(a)(4) requires “a showing that the use of the 
computer or computers in question was integral to the intended fraud and was not merely incidental.”). 
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Nevertheless, the agency approach is designed to cover misappropriation cases, cases in which 
the “locus of wrongful conduct” is not the computer.96  The computer is “merely the fortuitous 
place” where information was obtained.97  Misappropriation is consummated by  disclosing 
information to a competitor regardless of whether the information is obtained on a computer or 
from the employer’s files or wastebasket.98  
 Application of the agency approach would also federally criminalize theft of trade secrets 
without all the requirements of traditional trade secret law.  Misappropriation of information is 
not actionable under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act unless the information derives independent 
economic value from not being generally known and the plaintiff uses  reasonable efforts to 
maintain  its confidentiality.
99
  On the other hand, misappropriation of information can be 
actionable under the agency approach pursuant to section 1030(a)(2)(C) without satisfying either 
requirement.
100
  It is doubtful that Congress wished to displace a substantial portion of the 
common law without clearly conveying that intent.
101
  To the contrary, the Economic Espionage 
Act of 1996
102
 evidences Congress’ desire to maintain the traditional requirements of trade secret 
protection.  That Act criminalizes theft of trade secrets,
103
 and includes in its definition of  “trade 
secret” the same requirements contained in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.104 
 The agency approach also has the potential to produce absurd results that could not have 
been intended by Congress.  For example, an employee might be criminally liable for checking 
                                                        
96
 See US Bioservices Corp., 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1194; Brett Senior & Assocs., P.C. v. Fitzgerald, No. 06-1412, 2007 
WL 2043377, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2007). 
97
  Brett Senior & Assocs., No. 06-1412, 2007 WL 2043377, at *4. 
98
 See U.S. Bioservices Corp., 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1194; Brett Senior & Assocs., 2007 WL 2043377, at *4 n.7. 
99
 See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 (1985). 
100
 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
101
 See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (“We have cautioned … that ‘unless Congress conveys its 
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance’ in the prosecution of 
crimes.” (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971))). 
102
 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-294, Title I, § 101(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).  
103
 See Theft of Trade Secrets, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2006). 
104
 See Definitions, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) &(B) (2006). 
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personal e-mail or surfing the web.  Such activities are “the modern equivalent of getting up to 
stretch, or to talk briefly with a coworker.  It is downtime, time spent recharging mental 
batteries.”105  However, an employee engaged in those activities would be accessing a protected 
computer without authorization
106
 and would be obtaining information from the protected 
computer.
107
  Similarly, an employee who uses a company cell phone to call his or her spouse 
might be subject to criminal liability.
108
  
 Although the government is unlikely to prosecute such minor violations, as the Court in 
Nosal stated, “we shouldn’t have to live at the mercy of our local prosecutor.”109  Defining 
routine activities to be within the scope of the CFAA invites discriminatory and arbitrary 
enforcement.
110
  It is also fathomable that the government will prosecute under the CFAA when 
it believes, but is unable to prove, that a defendant is guilty of a more serious crime.  The threat 
of prosecution under the CFAA could be used to pressure a defendant to accept a plea even 
where the defendant was innocent of any other offense.  Furthermore, the potentially broad 
coverage of the CFAA that results from the agency approach can enable employers to harass 
employees or competitors with civil suits.
111
  In addition, “unauthorized” employees may be 
                                                        
105
 Kerr, supra note 7, at 1585. 
106
 Doing personal business during business hours could be viewed as a breach of the employee’s duty of loyalty.  
107
 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); cf. Clarity Servs., Inc. v. Barney, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 
1314 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting the agency approach, but suggesting that reading email would have been a 
violation of the Act under that approach). 
108
 Cell phones are protected computers for purposes of the CFAA.  See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 
900, 902-03 (8th Cir. 2011), United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005); Czech v. Wall St. on 
Demand, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1113 (D. Minn. 2009). 
109
 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute 
merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.”) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 
1591 (2010)). 
110
 Id. 
111 
See Id. at 860, n.6; P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 
510 (3d Cir. 2005); Bashaw v. Johnson, No. 11-2693-JWL, 2012 WL 1623483 (D. Kan. May 9, 2012); Joseph 
Oat Holdings, Inc. v. RCM Digesters, Inc., 409 Fed. Appx. 498, 506 (3d Cir 2010).  See also Nick Akerman, 
CFAA Resembles RICO, 27 NAT’L L.J. 13, 13 (Aug. 29, 2005) (“The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act … is 
fast becoming one of the most expansive and potent civil statutes in a civil litigator’s arsenal….”). 
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liable for civil damages for inadvertently causing damage or loss to their employers.
112
  For 
example, if an employee accepts employment elsewhere or otherwise violates her duty of 
loyalty, she can be held responsible if she innocently causes the employer’s system to crash even 
if the crash occurs while doing legitimate work for the employer.
113
 
 Finally, policy reasons do not support the agency approach.  It is unnecessary to distort 
the statutory mandate of the CFAA to prevent theft of trade secrets.  Traditional state actions for 
misappropriation, theft of trade secrets or breach of contract, are all available to deter improper 
conduct.  Criminal prosecution is also available under state statutes
114
 or the federal Economic 
Espionage Act.
115
  These alternative means of combating the theft of trade secrets have the 
advantage of leaving federal courts unburdened by state claims, which are routinely attached to 
CFAA counts through supplemental jurisdiction.
116
 Of course, the rule of lenity also counsels 
against adoption of the agency approach.
117
  
 
B. Contract Approach 
 The contract approach is consistent with the statutory language of the CFAA.  It is 
certainly possible to interpret “without authorization” or “exceeding authorized access” to 
encompass the violation of terms imposed as part of the authorization. However, the broad 
                                                        
112
 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(C) & (g) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
113
 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(e)(8) & (11) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
114
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN, § 5-36 (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. ANN. § 3930 (West 2012); TEX. PENAL CODE § 
31.05 (West 2012). 
115
 Economics Espionage, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2006). 
116
 See Economic Espionage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). There is no private right of action under the Economic 
Espionage Act, see, e.g., Pisani v. Van Iderstine, No.  CA 07-187S, 2007 WL 2319844, *3 (D. R.I. Aug. 9, 2007), so 
supplemental jurisdiction cannot be based upon that statute. 
117
  See supra note 61.  
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contract approach,
118
 much like the agency approach, appears inconsistent with Congressional 
intent and can lead to absurd, undesirable and possibly unconstitutional results. 
 As the contract approach is used to cover cases of employee theft of trade secrets,
119
 it is 
susceptible to many of the same criticisms as the agency approach: (1) the definitions of damage 
and loss suggest that Congress did not intend the Act to cover misappropriation cases;
120
 (2) the 
Act was designed to prohibit misconduct consummated on the computer, as opposed to 
prohibiting misconduct  after information is obtained from a computer;
121
 (3) application of the 
Act to trade secret cases would displace state common law absent any legislative intent to do 
so;
122
 (4) enactment of the Federal Economic Espionage Act, which incorporates the traditional 
requirements of trade secret law and does not provide  a private right of action, suggests that 
Congress affirmatively did not want the CFAA to displace state common law;
123
 (5) minor 
employee transgressions could unknowingly lead to criminal prosecution;
124
 (6) actions under 
state common law and the Economic Espionage Act are available to deter undesirable employee 
conduct without expanding the scope of the CFAA;
125
 and (7) allowing trade secret cases to be 
brought under the CFAA will flood federal courts because they will be litigated as supplemental 
state claims.
126
 
 Application of the contract approach outside the employee context,  such as in internet-
related cases, presents a unique set of problems. Contract limitations to access can be used to 
                                                        
118
 I define “the broad contract approach” as finding access without authorization or in excess of authorization 
whenever any contract limitation is violated.  
119
 See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012); EF 
Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). 
120
 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
121
 See  US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1189 (D. Kan. 2009). 
122
 See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000). 
123
 See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. 
124
 Kerr, supra note 7, at 25. 
125
 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
126
 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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reduce marketplace competition.
127
  A website’s terms of use might prohibit access to the site by 
any competitor.  An inability to quickly and cheaply obtain a competitor’s pricing information 
could lead to marketplace inefficiencies and higher prices.  
 The contract approach also criminalizes trivial wrongs. Many dating websites prohibit 
posting inaccurate or misleading information.
128
 Therefore, misstating one’s age or weight or 
posting an outdated picture on such a site could be a violation of section (a)(4).
129
  As stated 
earlier, until recently, Google forbade minors from using its service.
130
   Minors who used 
Google to research a paper for school could have been prosecuted under section (a)(2)(C).
131
  
Employees using their work computers to shop online during lunch could be violating the Act if 
the company’s policies contain the common prohibition against the use of company computers 
for non-business purposes.
132
  
 The rule of lenity, “which is rooted in considerations of notice,”133 argues against 
adoption of the broad contract approach.  “The Supreme Court has long warned against 
interpreting criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways that impose unexpected burdens on 
defendants.”134  Adopting the contract approach to interpret “without authorization” and 
“exceeding authorized access” definitely imposes such burdens.  Few defendants read the terms 
                                                        
127
 Cf. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 578-79 (1st Cir. 2001) (plaintiff likely to succeed on 
merits where defendant used confidential information which permitted competitor to cheaply obtain pricing 
information on the plaintiff’s website with a scraper program). 
128
 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 861 (9th Cir. 2012). 
129
 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  The requirement of fraudulent intent under that section does 
not require proof of common law fraud.   Rather, it is enough to demonstrate the defendant’s conduct was wrongful.  
See T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Terry, No. 3:11-cv-5655-RBL, 2012 WL 1409287, at *6 n.1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 23, 
2012); In re Thundervision, LLC, No. 09-111 A, 2010 WL 2219352, at *12 (Bkrtcy. E.D. La. June 1, 2010); eBay 
Inc. v. Digital Point Solutions, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
130
 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
131
 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
132
 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C) & (a)(4) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
133
 LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 
990, 1001 (9
th
 Cir. 2006)). 
134
 Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134, citing United States v Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).   
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of use of a website and those that do, often cannot  understand them.
135
  Worse still, many 
websites retain the right to change the terms of use at any time without providing notice of the 
change.
136
  
 This lack of notice may make section 1030(2)(a)(C) unconstitutionally void for 
vagueness under the contract approach .
137
  “As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement....”138  If “without authorization” and “in excess of 
authorization” are defined by private parties under terms of service, terms that are often unclear, 
unread, and subject to change without notice.,
139“ordinary people” will not “understand what 
conduct is prohibited.”140  Additionally, under the contract approach, routine conduct becomes 
criminal.  This impermissibly permits police officers and prosecutors to pursue their personal 
predilections concerning whom to arrest and prosecute.
141
  
 The contract approach raises troubling Constitutional questions beyond the void for 
vagueness doctrine.  First Amendment issues could arise if the terms of use prohibit access for 
                                                        
135
 See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862; Kerr, supra note 1, at 1659. 
136
 See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862. 
137
 See generally United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462-68 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Kerr, supra note 7, at 1573-78.  
In Nosal, the dissent, advocating the contract approach, acknowledged that approach might create vagueness 
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the purpose of engaging in political speech or deny access to those with a particular viewpoint.
142
  
One commentator has also suggested that application of the contract approach in the internet 
setting may run afoul of the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution.
143
  A basic tenet of 
statutory construction requires courts to avoid interpretations of statutes that raise Constitutional 
problems when alternative interpretations of the statute are fairly possible.
144
  Constitutional 
problems aside, allowing private parties to limit access to public websites inhibits the free flow 
of information that the internet was designed to enhance.
145
 
 Finally, adoption of the contract approach is not necessary to hold computer users 
responsible for breaching a website’s terms of use or company’s employment policies. 
Traditional common law actions, such as breach of contract, misappropriation, or theft of trade 
secrets, can deter undesirable conduct. Again, without clear congressional intent, these common 
law actions should not be displaced..
146
  Nor is it likely that Congress wished to flood federal 
courts with state actions that could be joined to a CFAA claim under supplemental 
jurisdiction.
147
   
 
C. Plain Meaning Approach 
 The plain meaning approach is generally consistent with the statutory language.  
However, that approach assumes that language is unambiguous.  More significantly, the 
language used to define “exceeding authorized access” in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC 
148
 and some other “plain meaning” cases,149 does not cover paradigm cases of computer fraud.   
                                                        
142
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143
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 As the Brekka court indicated,
150
 the dictionary definition of authorization is permission.  
However, permission is not an unambiguous term.  Permission can be limited or conditional.  For 
example, assume a professor gives permission to a student to access his phone during class if he 
receives an emergency call from his pregnant wife.  If the student accesses his phone to order a 
pizza, wouldn’t access to the phone for that purpose be unauthorized?  In short, the “plain 
meaning” approach cases generally do not explain why “authorization” should be interpreted to 
mean permission without considering limitations on that permission.
 151
 
 Similarly, the “plain meaning” approach’s definition of “exceeding authorized access” is 
not as “plain” as the approach suggests.  For example, the Fourth Circuit and a number of courts 
adopting the “plain meaning” approach interpret the statutory definition of “exceeds authorized 
access” to  apply to a person who is permitted to use the computer but who accesses information 
that he or she is not permitted to access.
152
  “In other words, the term ‘exceeds authorized 
access,’ like the term ‘access without authorization,’ requires proof that the offender entered 
some forbidden virtual space….”153 There are two problems with this definition.  First, the 
definition does not indicate how one decides if the access extends beyond what is permitted: Is it 
determined by contract, by password or by some other way? Second, following the Fourth 
Circuit’s interpretation, this would mean that a bank teller, who fraudulently alters an account 
that he or she is  authorized to access and alter in other circumstances,  would not be entering any 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
149
 See cases cited infra notes 152-53. 
150
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forbidden virtual space and therefore, would not be violating section 1030(a)(4).
154
 However, 
such conduct is precisely the type of computer fraud that should, and Congress undoubtedly 
intended to, be covered by the Act.  
 Criticizing existing approaches is easy. Developing a comprehensive alternative is more 
demanding. That is the challenge undertaken in the following section. 
 
 
V. RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO DEFINING “WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION” AND 
“IN EXCESS OF AUTHORIZATION” 
 
A. Defining “Without Authorization” 
It is a “fundamental canon of statutory construction … that, unless otherwise defined, 
words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”155  As the 
Brekka court found, the ordinary meaning of “without authorization” is “without permission.”156  
The problem, as suggested above,
157
 is that “permission” is an ambiguous term. 
 When faced with ambiguous statutory language, it is appropriate to look to the legislative 
intent.
158
  There are several indications that Congress viewed unauthorized access as a trespass 
on another’s computer.159 After all, computer hacking “is akin to a trespass in cyberspace.”160  
Thus, it is fitting to look at trespass law to define “without authorization.”161  
  
 
                                                        
154
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The Model Trespass Statute states in part: 
A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to 
do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is 
given by: 
(a) actual communication to the actor; or 
(b) posting in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the 
attention of intruders; or 
(c) fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to exclude intruders.
162
 
 
 Based partly on the language of the model trespass statute,
163
 this article recommends that 
“accesses a protected computer without authorization” be defined as “to communicate with a 
protected computer without any permission, by circumventing code protection, e.g. password 
requirements, or after given specific notice that permission has been denied or revoked.”  The 
phrase, “without any permission,” is designed to cover the computer hacker while excluding 
employees or persons accessing websites open to the public even if their access violates 
contractual limitations.  Circumventing password or other code-based protection is the analogue 
to fencing, designed to exclude intruders.  Specific notice corresponds with actual notice to the 
actor.  
 Despite the possible analogy to “posting in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably 
likely to come to the attention of intruders,”164 the proposed definition of “without authorization” 
does not consider contract limitations to access.  For the reasons provided in the discussion of the 
shortcomings of the “contract approach,”165 broad contract limitations, such as restrictions on the 
use of information, cannot be allowed to define a person who accesses information “without 
authorization.”  
                                                        
162
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(2) (2012). 
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 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (2012). 
164
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165
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A more difficult question is whether contractual limitations on access that are violated at 
the time of access should be considered to limit a person’s authorization. For example, should 
access by a competitor or use of a robot be considered unauthorized when prohibited by a site’s 
terms and conditions of use? 
This article rejects consideration of even these more limited contract restrictions when 
determining if an access is “without authorization.” As suggested earlier, terms of use are often 
unclear, seldom read and frequently subject to change without notice.
166
  Accordingly, it is better 
to presume that notice “is not likely to come to the attention of intruders”167 instead of incurring 
litigation costs to decide whether particular clickwrap or browserwrap agreements provide 
adequate notice.
168
  The presumption that terms of use do not provide adequate notice is also 
justified by the rule of lenity:
169
 a desire to keep the internet an open channel for information, 
and the ability of website owners to protect their interests by either individualized notice of lack 
of authorization or code protection.
170
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B. Defining “Exceeds Authorized Access” 
 The Act defines “exceeds authorized access” as “to access a computer with authorization 
and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not 
entitled so to obtain or alter.”171  Difficulty arises because the definition does not indicate when 
someone is entitled to alter or obtain information.  
 Under trespass law, consent is a defense precluding liability.
172
  However, the defense is 
vitiated when the activity on the property is beyond the scope of the consent.
173
  A party can 
exceed the scope of consent either by acting in a manner unnecessary to achieve the express or 
implied purpose of the consent or by violating explicit restrictions on the consent.
174
  
 By analogy to trespass law, this article recommends that the courts should interpret 
“exceeds authorized access” as referring to when a person obtains or alters information beyond 
what is necessary for the accomplishment of the general purpose for which access was initially 
authorized or in violation of prominent limitations on the type of information that can be 
obtained or altered.  Once again, this article presumes that the notices in clickwrap and 
browserwrap agreements are not sufficiently prominent.
175
  Violations of restrictions on the use 
of information, even if prominently displayed, would not “exceed authorized access” because the 
statutory definition focuses on  obtaining or altering the information, acts that are consummated 
on the computer, not the information’s subsequent use.  
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 This article rejects a strictly code-based interpretation of “exceeds authorized access”176 
because it conflicts with trespass law (where access beyond the scope of consent is improper 
even if the land improperly accessed is not fenced)
177
 and is seriously under-inclusive.  For 
example, if a person lends someone else their cell phone in an emergency, that should not permit 
the user to access naked pictures of the Good Samaritan’s wife that have been saved on that 
phone.  Similarly, a doctor that has access to patients’ records at a hospital should not be allowed 
to review a patient’s  personal information who is not being treated by that doctor.  Section 
1030(a)(2) was designed to protect personal privacy,
178
 and it is often impractical or inefficient 
to password-protect every individual piece of data on a computer. A code-based approach’s 
under-inclusiveness is perhaps more troubling for actions brought under section 1030(a)(4).  For 
example, a clerk who has access to account receivable files would not violate that section under a 
code-based approach even if she deleted customers’ accounts (wiping out their debt) in return for 
kickbacks from the debtor.  Surely Congress intended section 1030(a)(4) to cover such 
fundamental computer fraud. 
 
C. Two Potential Problems with the Recommended Interpretation and the 
(Possibly Unnecessary) Legislative Remedy 
 
 The recommended interpretation has two potential shortcomings that result from the 
“plain meaning” of the statute.  First, a literal reading of section (2)(a)(C)179 would produce 
absurd results under the recommended interpretation.  Second, the language of sections (a)(5) 
                                                        
176
 See Kerr, supra note 1, at 1663; see also Urban, supra note 53 at 1410 (recommending code-based approach with 
amendment to Section (a)(5)(A)); Field, supra note 53, 841-42 (2009) (recommending code-based approach as 
default option with possible modification by clear contract language). 
177
 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 158, cmt. c, 892A(1) cmt. g (2000). 
178
 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 4 (1996); S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (1986).  
179
 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
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and (e)(6)
180
 seem to conflict with the recommendation of treating an employee who hacks into a 
code-protected part of the computer as unauthorized rather than as exceeding authorized 
access.
181
  However, there are numerous reasons to reject such literal readings of the statute.  
 
1. Limiting the Scope of Section 1030(2)(a)(C) 
 Section 1030(2)(a)(C) prohibits intentionally accessing a computer without authorization 
or in excess of authorization and by that means, obtaining information from any protected 
computer.
182
  Under the recommended approach, an employee who uses a work computer for 
personal reasons has exceeded authorized access.
183
  Such use is beyond that which is necessary 
to accomplish the purpose for which access was authorized.  Therefore, an employee who surfs 
the web during lunch hour would be violating the literal reading of section 1030(a)(2)(C).
184
  
Such a result is untenable.  However, the problem lies with the literal reading of that subsection, 
not with the recommended interpretation of the Act. 
 Section 1030(2)(a)(C) should be read to only prohibit obtaining private or confidential 
information without authorization or in excess of authorization.  The legislative history contains 
multiple indications that section 1030(2)(a)(C) was designed to safeguard the protected computer 
owner’s privacy, not public information.185  Application of the Act without the suggested 
limiting interpretation would produce absurd results under any approach.  For example, if a 
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patron goes behind the information desk at a bookstore to look up a title on the computer, she 
would be violating the law.  A child who retrieves a text message from her parent’s cell phone 
without permission would be a criminal.
186
  Similarly, if a  child, without asking, uses a friend’s 
iPad to surf the web, she would be subject to prosecution.  The Supreme Court has often 
emphasized that statutes should be interpreted to avoid such absurd results.
187
 
 Constitutional considerations also recommend the suggested limiting interpretation of 
section 1030(a)(2)(C).  Criminalizing access to information raises First Amendment concerns.  
Although the right of access to information is not absolute, restrictions on access normally 
require a justification.
188
   If the information is not private or confidential, it is difficult to justify 
section 1030(a)(2)(C)’s restraint, particularly given the punishment for unauthorized access in 
other sections of the Act.
189
  The broad scope of section 1030(a)(2)(C) without the proposed 
limitation may also be unconstitutionally vague.  Routine conduct can become criminal.  This 
impermissibly allows police officers and prosecutors to pursue their personal predilections 
concerning whom to arrest and prosecute.
190
  When possible, statutes should be interpreted to 
avoid such potential constitutional problems.
191
 
 This article advocates that the suggested limiting interpretation of section 1030(2)(a)(C) 
is appropriate. Congress did not intend that section to apply to non-private or publicly accessible 
information., Moreover, interpreting section 1030(2)(a)(C) to cover such information  would 
                                                        
186
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produce absurd, and possibly unconstitutional, results under any approach .  Nonetheless, to 
ensure the proper interpretation of that section, it is recommended that Congress amend section 
1030(a)(2) by inserting the words “private or confidential” before “information” in subsection 
(C). 
 
2. Treating Employees as Unauthorized Rather than Exceeding 
Authorized Access When They Hack Into a Code-protected Part 
of a Protected Computer 
 
 The definition of “exceeds authorized access” appears to cover employees who hack into 
code-protected parts of their work computer. 
192
  An employee is authorized to access his work 
computer but by hacking into a code-protected part of the computer, she obtains information in 
the computer that she is not entitled to obtain.  Despite the language of section 1030(e)(6), there 
are several reasons to treat such an employee as unauthorized rather than exceeding authorized 
access. 
The only practical consequence under the Act that results from the classification of 
exceeding authorized access, as opposed to unauthorized access, is avoidance of liability for 
unintentional damage or loss under sections 1030(a)(5)(b) & (c).
193
 Yet, the risk of loss or 
damage should be on an employee who hacks into a code-protected part of the computer.  The 
employer’s adoption of code protection for internal parts of the computer suggests that the risk of 
loss or damage from access is real.  At a minimum, it indicates that the employer has taken 
reasonable steps to notify employees that access to the code-protected parts of the computer are 
unauthorized.  An employee who knowingly and intentionally goes where she does not belong, 
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as opposed to violating a non-explicit understanding of authorized access, should be responsible 
for the loss or damage she creates. 
 Treating the employee hacker as unauthorized is also consistent with trespass law.  As 
suggested earlier, password or other code protection is the equivalent of fencing under the Model 
Trespass Statute.
194
  It provides notice that the employee is not entitled to enter the code-
protected realm and that doing so without consent constitutes a trespass.  The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts also suggests that improper access to a code-protected part of the computer 
should be treated as a trespass.  Section 158, comment c states, in part,  “If the possessor of land 
gives a consent to the actor's presence upon only a particular part of his land, the actor's 
intentional entry upon any other part of the land is an intrusion, and, if unprivileged, is a 
trespass.”195  The legislative history suggests that Congress intended section 1030(a)(5) to 
“criminalize[]  all  computer trespasses.”196 
 Finally, literally interpreting the language of section 1030(e)(6) would produce 
undesirable results that could not have been intended in the Internet context.  A person is always 
permitted to access a site’s public homepage.  If the site requires a password to go further, a 
person who hacks into the site should be responsible for any damage or loss she creates.  On the 
other hand, with the literal application, a hacker would only be liable under section 1030(a)(5) 
for intentional damage because she would merely be exceeding authorized access since she was 
initially authorized to access the protected computer through the home page.  
 Although this article argues that an employee-hacker can be reasonably treated as 
unauthorized, as opposed to merely exceeding authorization, the language of the Act suggests 
                                                        
194
 See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. 
195
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158, cmt. c (1965). 
196
 S. REP. NO., 104-357, at 11 (1996) (emphasis added). 
13 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1 (2012)  34 
otherwise.  Thus, legislative amendment would be desirable to remove any doubt.  It is 
recommended that the Act be amended to include the following definition: 
 The term “accesses a computer without authorization” means to use or communicate with 
a protected computer either 
a) without any permission,   
b) by circumventing password or other code protection, or  
c) after individual notice that  permission has been denied or revoked. 
 
 
D. Advantages of the Suggested Approach 
 The recommended interpretation of the CFAA is consistent with the language of the 
statute and most closely coincides with Congressional intent to limit coverage of the Act to 
crimes consummated on the computer.
197
  The suggested approach covers core computer crimes 
– theft of private information, fraudulent alteration of data, and intentional or unauthorized 
damage to computer systems or data – but neither co-opts state common law claims nor clogs 
federal courts with supplemental state claims.  The approach does not impose liability without 
clear knowledge of culpability, but provides mechanisms (password protection or individualized 
denial or revocation of access) to computer owners to protect their interests.  It best balances the 
individual’s right to privacy and the public’s interest in free and open access to information.  
Unlike existing law in many circuits, this article’s interpretation of the Act does not raise 
Constitutional problems or violate the rule of lenity.  Finally, the recommended approach is 
relatively easy to apply because unlike some other approaches, it does not consider subjective 
intent.  
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  E.   Illustrations of Application of the Suggested Approach 
 1. An associate at a law firm uses her work computer to check the weather for the 
weekend – the employee has exceeded authorized access (because the access was not necessary 
for work), but there would be no violation because the information obtained would not be private 
or confidential.  Without the suggested limiting interpretation to section 1030(a)(2)(C), there 
would arguably be a violation under every approach. 
 2. A secretary surfing the web during the work day downloads a file which contains a 
worm that causes the company computer a loss of more than $5,000 – the employee has 
exceeded authorized access but is not responsible for the damage because the damage was 
unintentional.  Under the agency approach, and possibly the contract approach,
198
 the access is 
unauthorized and the employee would be liable for the loss as well as subject to criminal 
prosecution. 
 3. A salesperson accepts employment with her employer’s competitor and e-mails 
confidential customer lists to the competitor – the salesperson is authorized to access the 
customer lists for her job, so the access is neither unauthorized nor exceeding authorized access.  
Therefore, the salesperson would not have violated the CFAA.  The salesperson could be liable 
under common law theories, such as breach of contract or theft of trade secrets.  Under the 
agency and contract approaches, the salesperson would likely be criminally liable under the 
CFAA.  This would be true even if the employer did not take reasonable steps to maintain the 
information’s confidentiality. 
 4. The salesperson in the prior example deletes all of their files before leaving for the new 
job – the salesperson is authorized to access the computer; whether she has  exceeded 
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authorization depends upon whether the salesperson is authorized to delete files as part of her 
job.  However, whether the salesperson is unauthorized or exceeding authorization should not be 
significant.  The salesperson should be liable under section 1030(a)(5) for intentional damage to 
the computer and would not have violated sections 1030(a)(2) & (a)(4), even if unauthorized. 
 5.  A system’s administrator at a University, who is also taking classes at the school, 
accesses a professor’s computer and reads a copy of the final exam – access to the professor’s 
computer is authorized by the system’s administrator, but reading the exam is not necessary for 
the job and therefore, it exceeds authorized access.  There would be a violation of the Act as the 
information obtained is private or confidential. This would not be a violation under either 
Professor Kerr’s strictly code-based approach (because no code was violated)199 or the Fourth 
Circuit’s plain meaning approach (because access to the information was authorized). 
 6. A company uses a robot to obtain pricing information from its competitor’s public 
website – without more, the company is authorized to use the site and has not exceeded 
authorized access.  It could still be liable for intentional damage to the competitor’s computer if 
knowledge could be imputed to the company that the competitor’s system would be damaged by 
the use of the robot.
200
  The company’s access would be unauthorized if: either the company 
circumvented code protection against use of a robot or, the competitor, after detecting the use of 
the robot, notified the company that it was  no longer authorized to use the site.  If unauthorized, 
there would still be no violation of section 1030(a)(2) because the information is not private or 
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 See Kerr, supra note 1 (a strictly code-based approach requires an authorized user to improperly access code-
protected information to exceed authorized access). 
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 Intention might be imputed to the company if it understood the likely effects of its actions – that making an 
extremely large number of search requests would slow down the competitors operations.  Cf. Pulte Homes, Inc. v.  
Laborers’ Int’l. Union, 648 F.3d 295, 303 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding intentional conduct where the defendant sent e-
mails at such a volume that it should have understood the likely effects of its conduct was to slow the plaintiff’s 
computer system, although the court also found that such likely effect was probably one of the defendant’s 
objectives).  However, this would be a difficult standard to meet given evidence that most uses of robots do not 
interfere with a system’s operations.  See Galbraith, supra note 33, at 333. 
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confidential.  However, there would be liability under section 1030(a)(5) for any damage or loss, 
even if unintentional.  
 7. A single woman intentionally misstates her age and weight on a computer-dating site, 
which she accesses with a valid password.– The woman is authorized to use the site and has not 
exceeded authorized access.  However, if the misstatements are reported to the dating site, they 
could ban the woman from further access to the site, making such later access unauthorized.  
Based on the terms of most dating sites, the initial access is unauthorized or in excess of 
authorization under a contract approach.  Arguably, if the access is unauthorized or exceeding 
authorized access, there would be a violation of sections 1030(2)(a)(C) and (a)(4).
201
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Although few attorneys and even fewer laypeople are familiar with the CFAA, litigation 
under the Act has dramatically increased.
202
  Despite the large number of cases that have been 
decided, the Courts have not agreed upon a proper interpretation of the Act.  A majority of the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals that have interpreted the Act have read it broadly, apparently wishing 
to ensure that disloyal employees are punished under the Act.  Such interpretations are not 
dictated by the language of the statute and are inconsistent with the legislative history of the Act. 
Broad interpretation of the Act raises Constitutional problems, violates the rule of lenity, can 
inhibit competition, displaces state law without any clear Congressional intent to do so, increases 
the number of supplemental state claims brought to federal court, and threatens to result in 
liability for common and accepted conduct. Reliance on prosecutorial discretion to choose which 
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 The unauthorized access could provide private information about another site user. It also might be considered 
fraud under section (a)(4) that resulted in obtaining something of value – a date, possibly with expenses paid. 18 
U.S.C. § 1030 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
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 A Westlaw search of cases containing “CFAA” during the decade of the 1990’s returned just four cited case.  By 
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cases to bring is not an acceptable solution, particularly when civil litigators have also begun to 
abuse the Act.
203
 
 Given the availability of common law actions to punish the disloyal employee, there is no 
reason to suffer the consequences of some Circuit Courts’ broad reading of the statute. Instead, 
this article has recommended a narrow interpretation of the CFAA which builds upon the “plain 
meaning” approach, that has been adopted by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, and derives, in part, 
from analogy to trespass law.  Persons “without authorization” would include outsiders (those 
without any permission), those who have circumvented password or other code protection, and 
anyone who has been individually notified that their access has been denied or revoked.  A 
person would “exceed authorized access” when she obtains or alters information either beyond 
that necessary to accomplish the general purpose for which access was granted or in violation of 
prominent limitations on the type of information that can be obtained or altered.  In addition, the 
proposed interpretation of the Act would limit section 1030(a)(2)(c) to unauthorized access or 
access in excess of authorization of private or confidential information. This article’s 
recommendations avoid the pitfalls of the existing approaches to the Act, prohibit the core 
computer crimes that Congress intended to be covered under the Act,
204
, and optimally balances 
an individuals’ interest in privacy with the public’s interest in free and open communications on 
the Internet.  Although this article argues that the proposed approach to the Act is a valid 
interpretation of the existing law, minor legislative amendments are recommended to maximize 
the likelihood that all courts concur. 
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 See supra note 159.  See also A.V.  ex. rel Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 645 (4th Cir. 2008) (the 
CFAA is “a statute generally intended to deter computer hackers”). 
